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Abstract
This article focuses on the philosophical implications of Euro-centrism and Eurocentric
discourse for the Western human rights narrative. It is argued that there is insuﬃcient
theoretical and practical consideration of those implications, particular for advocacy and
activity in the so-called “Third World” where such arguments frequently become mere
vehicles for the advance of economic and political neocolonialism. In many ways, colonialism with a humanistic, liberal democratic “face”. Finally, a proposition is advanced that if
the Western human rights discourse is to be eﬀectively corrected and evolve into a global
one, critiques of Euro-centrism from outside the Western discursive world must be taken
seriously.
Keywords
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Our subject of rumination for the moment, the western human rights
discourse. It extends the apparently inviting pleasantry “Come, let me hear
your voice!” Inherent in the salutation is the fact that the one objectiﬁed in
the greeting is being invited to a pre-existing discourse. That may in fact be
the rub.

The Nature and Problem of Eurocentrism
The global system as we know is largely a function not of natural evolution, but of European colonialism and neocolonialism. More importantly,
subsequent to that historical epoch there was the imposition of an intellectual paradigm that colonized knowledge itself as well as the processes for
producing knowledge. Within the context of Euro-centrism, the West
© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2008
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both creates the parameters of legitimate discussion concerning global
issues and then serves as the de facto “ideal type” and standard for evaluative judgments relative to those issues. Even worse, Western created and
sustained international organizations and domestic state institutions and
legal entities are appealed to as the judicial authorities, administering admonitions, sanctions, and other punishments as consequences for deviance
from the Western forms. Not surprisingly to anyone, except perhaps the
West itself, non-Western forms, ideas, and concepts are found wanting and
deﬁcient and therefore subject to exclusion from the theater of debate and
communicative legitimacy. I wrote in another piece about how the “vampire” was a proper and ﬁt metaphor for Euro-centrism. It is rendered as
such in Bob Marley’s song “Babylon Vampire,” in which he lays out its
essential consequences.
Like the mythological vampire, Euro-centrism pursues its own interests
at the expense of the psychological, sociological, economic, and political
well-being of those it victims and does so my enrapturing them with illusions of love or at least mutual interest. Most modern conﬁgurations of
Dracula describe a tortured creature, which is spiritually disﬁgured, believing at times that he or she does indeed “love” the one they systematically
devour. Worst of all, the great malady of the vampire’s condition is the
denial of its own existence as ghoul. The vampire believes himself or herself
to be alive and so much wants to be a part of the world, yet inevitably must
slink back to the coﬃn, to the grains of earth of their original burial (the
seeds of Platonic epistemology and the Enlightenment), all before the
encroachment of the sun, ever representing the force of true illumination
from which nothing undead may hide and by whose light they shall surely
be judged and found wanting. Next to the sun of external recognition, there
is no greater threat than a mirror. For the mirror represents self-criticism,
the capacity to reﬂect on oneself as monster. When gazing out, Eurocentrism sees nothing. Or we might better say, sees nothing beyond itself,
believing itself to be the germinal seed of existence, without which being is
meaningless.
It seems senseless for those victimized or in the path of this demon to
despise the essence of what the creature is, for it is merely responding to its
nature. Marimba Ani in Yurugu characterized this as the asili, or the equivalent of “cultural DNA.”1 Since the predatory nature of the beast is so
1)

Ani 2007, p. 12.
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embedded within structure, it is unwise and dangerous to speak of “reform”.
It must be destroyed where it lives . . . in its realm of its feeling, its “black
heart”, and its damaged Frankensteinian mind.

How Historical and Present Eurocentric Power Taints Communicative
Interchange with “Others”: How the Non-Western is Rendered “Mute”
Stephen Lukes, political theorist and John Gaventa, political scientist,
present the matter in forms useful for our consideration of this question of
human rights. Gaventa, in Power and Powerlessness,2 presents it in his
attempt to work with and theorize about working with the disadvantaged
in the U.S. Appalachians. He is confronted with recalcitrance on the part
of his constituency of aid and notes that mainstream theory would be
likely to categorize this behavior as “apathy.” But he is inclined to believe
that what presents itself socially and empirically as “apathy,” is in fact a
response to the historical consequences of oppressive neocolonial power.
He references Lukes and his work in Power: A Radical View,3 where the
latter posits three dimensions to power.
The ﬁrst dimension of power is one with which sociologists are intimately acquainted, and that is the feared “power over.” The power understood to be wielded traditionally by forces of oppression and domination.
The second, certainly explored by interpretive sociologists in some detail,
is the “power to.” Certainly, wielded by those same centers of power in
some cases, it also the object of resistance movements. They seek to acquire
it so as to bring about reform or revolution and the amelioration of their
condition of social injustice and exploitation. Yet, Lukes presents a third
dimension of power, one I believe poorly comprehended within existing
sociological theory and one that is at the foundation of Euro-centric praxis.
This dimension of power is the capacity to deﬁne the political agenda. It is
obfuscated from traditional sociological analysis because it does not present
in the form of a validity claim for “power over” or “power to.” It describes
itself as the mere backdrop or context for the legitimate exercise of other
forms of power, yet it is in this power to consecrate the legitimate realms
of rational discourse that it is more coercive than the power it facilitates.
It is this “third face” of power that Carter G. Woodson was referring to
when he surmised that though the chains might be removed from the slave
2)
3)

Gaventa 1982.
Lukes, 2004.
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and the signs identifying social distinctions between “whites” and “Negroes”
taken down, the mentality of those who had been victimized by oppression
had been “educated” in a manner such that they would reconstruct (in
league with their oppressors) their own demise.4 It is the one referenced
also in the historical mythological “Lynch letter” where Africans in the
Diaspora are given an antagonistic, oppositional perception of their own
community which would, it was believed, perpetuate enslavement without
the mechanisms of restraint.5 It was the object of the admonition of El
Hajj Malik el-Shabazz when he warned that one should never “ask a slave
what he wants.” The slave would not know what he or she wants outside of
the context of freedom, which would never be the object of his or her asking. As such, their response would be meaningless and to grant it, would
be merely to grant further dispensation to the system of enslavement. Cautioning us also was Audre Lorde, who told us clearly, one cannot use the
“master’s tools” to deconstruct the “master’s house.”6 So to the critics within
Western critical theory who noted the paradox of arguing that the systems
of Eurocentric modernity were corrupt and “unfree,” while simultaneously
maintaining that the intellectual products of those civilizations were and
are the only methodological tools for human freedom.

How Historical and Present Eurocentric Ethnocentrism Taints Communicative Interchange: How the West is Rendered “Deaf ”
As regards the human rights discourse particularly, we might employ the
rich metaphorical and analogical framework given us in Greco-Roman
mythology in the characters of Echo and Narcissus. Echo was a nymph in
love with her own voice. Zeus was taken to consorting with the nymphs
and employed Echo as an agent to occupy the time and thoughts of his
spouse Hera, while he continued his ceaseless adulteries. Hera eventually
exposed the plot and punished Echo by allowing her to say only the last
words of other’s sentences. Narcissus was a human deemed to be so beautiful that all who saw him fell in love with him. Echo later meets Narcissus
and falls in love with him as well. She is shy, so she follows him and reaches
a vantage point where she can see him, but he can not see her. He becomes
lost and says “Is anyone here?” Echo answered “Here, here, here.” He forces
4)
5)
6)

Woodson 2006.
Embree 1931.
Bereano 1984, pp. 110–113.
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her to expose herself. When she does, she communicates her love to him in
a nonverbal way, but he rebuﬀs her. Eventually she prays for death. She is
given death, but her voice lived on, beloved of the goddess Aphrodite.
Narcissus later gets his come-uppance. A girl, who falls in love with him,
prays that he suﬀer from the unrequited love he engendered in others. The
goddess Nemesis curses him by making him fall in love with his own
reﬂection.
We have to begin my contemplating this character Echo. She is deﬁned
initially as loving her own voice. One might say that the capacity of European colonialism and neocolonialism to exercise predominant power in
deﬁning the parameters of global aﬀairs has enabled it to stamp the world
with its own voice. In fact, much of the period of classical colonialism was
spent “planting” the voice of European forms and their associated Eurocentric rationale in all corners of the world. Thus, religions were forcibly
transformed into either Western forms or hybrids. Those who resisted were
killed or at least marginalized as “heathens.” Capitalist ﬂows, transferring
the world’s material resources to Europe, the US, and Japan were codiﬁed
under various ideological banners of development, globalization, globalism,
or interdependence and those who resisted branded socialist or communist
enemies or reactionaries. Western state structures and processes and their
political liberalisms were presented as “democratization.” Systematically,
every face of human social, political, economic, cultural, and psychological
life was molded to reﬂect the worldview of the colonial masters, even the
maps of the world themselves.
Frankie Goes to Hollywood recorded an introduction to their Welcome
to the Pleasuredome album in which the lead singer says repeatedly “The
World is My Oyster.”7 Certainly, this was the view of the global conquerors. Here, we say the world is my Echo. For the voice of the world became
the voice of the West. Thus there was no “voice of the oppressed” that
might reasonable be listened to, or at least that could be recognized authoritatively as such. It’s important too, to recognize the critical reality that
Karl Marx so exceptionally lays out as regards the inextricable link between
the ideological superstructure and the base of control of the means of production beneath. Echo speaks initially to allow the god to commit adultery. In fact, this adultery is actually rape, since Zeus, as the most powerful
deity, cannot be resisted in his sexual advances in any greater degree than
African women could resist the incessant advances of lecherous slave7)

Hollywood, 1985.
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masters. Echo then is the foil or the ruse for the criminal plot to exploit the
nymphs and to deceive. Euro-centrism was born as the self-fulﬁlling ideological justiﬁcation for European domination and oppression of the world.
It was a foil in that its ontological and epistemological frameworks and
arguments were not about truth or knowledge, but targeted instead at
ideological “softening” of the objects of victimization. It pushed the ethic
“thou shalt not steal” as it stole everything in sight. “Thou shalt not kill as
it slaughtered everything and in the name of God. Thou shalt not take the
name of the Lord they God in vain as it connected the messiah to white
supremacy imagery and ﬁlled the heads of black and brown people with
ﬂying white angels, white last suppers, and white gods.
In Scott’s book, Domination and the Arts of Resistance,8 he presents us
with the critical dimensions of Echo’s downfall. For the extent of Eurocentric domination of global discourse presented the would-be global rulers
with an inability to access the most critical element necessary to maintain
their authority, the thoughts of the oppressed. Within the thoughts of the
oppressed one might ﬁnd strategies for resistance and revolution. But they
heard nothing, but their own voices. Every serf, and slave, and woman,
and savage spoke of “yes, sir boss” and the master and mistress were left
sure of only one thing that they had heard nothing. What they had heard
was the sound of their own oppression being echoed back to them. Their
inability to get past the wall they so heavily fortiﬁed and maintained to see
the enemy certainly beyond was the undoing of colonialism in its initial
form. When the “voice of the oppressed” was ultimately heard in all its
clarity, it came with a sword, drenched often in blood.
But all was not lost for the Western world. For in the downfall of colonial empire, there remained the ideological rationale itself. This rationale
gloriﬁed and legitimate Western forms and concepts. Where it holds sway,
we see Western political, social, and economic structure and we hear still
the voices of “democracy” and “liberalization” and “freedom.” Echoes still.
Yet, this is the plight of Narcissus. Narcissus was not there when Echo was
punished, but like Echo he is drunk with his own legend. For her it was her
voice, reﬂected in every corner of the world still even after the demise of
her glory. For him, it was not the literal repetition of his voice, but the
veneration of his image. In many ways he is both less arrogant and more
self-centered than Echo. For Narcissus feigns self-loathing. He rejects the
admiration of others for him, resisting and turning down the Echo. This is
8)

Scott 1990.
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the position of those Westerners who lead the human rights discourse
today. They are quick in their criticisms of the West and its history, but in
their rejection fail to recognize that even their visions of liberation are
embedded, not in a globally constructed discourse, but in the reiﬁcation of
the same imperial structures that necessitated the move towards “human
rights” in the ﬁrst place. This is the dialectical positioning of the ex-white
supremacist who travels the world earning huge sums as an antiracist
speaker and trainer. Ask them whether their status as an antiracist is also a
consequence of white supremacy, since no person of color similarly politically situated would be likely to garner such status, and they will often fail
to get the question.
Despite Narcissus apparent “strange nobility” in steering the love of
others from his visage, he himself comes to be occupied with a contemplation of his own image as reﬂected. Thus, while the Western human rights
advocate does not require by statement, the advocacy of Western forms,
these forms are a presumption when he or she engages the debate over
human rights. Human means the Western deﬁnition of “human.” It must,
otherwise, it would be a matter of debate and contention since there are
diﬀerent deﬁnitions of humanity across cultures. The lack of contention is
not an artifact of universal agreement (the plurality of societies across the
world being the empirical evidence mitigating against such a reductionist
conclusion), but rather monologue. Likewise, the “rights” theory of human
advancement is inevitably a philosophical situation within the Western
discourse of rights and social contracts, clearly foreign to most societies,
but presumed. These foundational epistemological assumptions are part of
that aforementioned “third face” of power. They are embedded in the agenda
of human rights itself.

The Folly of Seeking “Democracy” in View of The Resulting Western
Ideological Monologue
To assure that no real contention over these imperialistic presumptions is
allowed, there is a Narcissus tendency, or assimilative impulse, that takes
the “voice of the oppressed” and ﬁxes it within the context of the ongoing
Western discourse. It is a form of co-optation. If you say “democracy,” the
immediate presumption is that you mean Western democracy and that
you are speaking of the Western developed form as if there was no other.
The notion that there are theories of democracy that do not stem from the
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West and are even hostile to the bourgeois notions of the same is not part
of the legitimate debate. If you say “development” or something similar in
economic terms, everyone assumes you either mean traditional global capitalism or at least some “liberalization” of the same. If not, maybe you
mean Marxian socialism. The notion that you mean none of that and that
there are economic systems that have nothing to do with the West that
might oﬀer not only diﬀerent, but better conﬁgurations for human economic empowerment and liberation is not on the table. One of the most
diﬃcult meta-assumptions is the Enlightenment proposition of the individual, central to the Western notion of rights, but extremely problematic
for the collectivist societies of the world, particularly in the developing
world. The notions of alternative theories of the individual, or even of
human liberation theories that totally discard Western individualism are
not negotiable.
I’d like to present an empirical example of problems posed by Western
human rights discourse using various examples from traditional Africa,
particularly the Bantu of the southern part of the continent. One of the
principle issues of human rights is the necessity for the institutionalization
of processes and structures designed to protect these “rights.” Often this
devolves into inherently and repeatedly failed attempts to import wholesale Western judicial procedures and forms out of their “natural habitat.”
There are some fundamental aspects central to African traditional judiciary
that are likely to be missed by those caught conceptually in the EchoNarcissus dialectic. The normal activist strategy is “Echo” in that the ideal
forms for dispute resolution are presumed to be Western courts and connected structures. It is “Narcissus” in the sense that African traditional
aspirations for justice and law and order are “heard” as analogous to the
claims presented by and on behalf of Western liberalism.

Alternative Non-Western Perspectives on Democratizing Political
Formations: Selected African Cases
Central in African traditional systems of justice are the concepts of spatially and locality. Power, political and judicial, is wielded among the Bantu
of Southern Africa via a communal political formation known as mbongi.
The relevance of this term to our theoretical exposition here is evident in
its frequent translation in Western discourse as “democracy” or as a synonym for “democracy.” This pagan, as in village, egalitarian construction
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may be communalist, but bears little if any resemblance to the political
structures of the West, in even their most socialist moments. Mbongi quite
literally translates into an indigenous concept which relates it to the centralized meeting place within the collective. It is centralized in that it might
be described as equally accessible both to all potential participating political actors and to all foreseeable, navigable points of destination in the local
spatial map. It is a nexus without which one cannot traverse daily. Its very
existential nature establishes a commonality in the routinization of the
everyday lives of the people. The selection of a location for the would-be
“house of social justice, then, may be the most critical decision an advocate
will make.
The term “mbongi” refers literally to a simple architectural structure centrally located in tile
villages of the Bantu and of those in the Kongo region in particular. The shelter is the seat
and site of local communal power and is the physical manifestation and representation of
ancestral political and social authority. This entity is of critical importance within the
Kibantu, the corpus of Bantu philosophy. The term “mbongi” derives from the verbal root
“bonga” which, in the Kikongo language and related linguistic dialects of the region,
signiﬁes the act of accepting possession of or owning.9

History is littered with the ashes of failed peacemaking and reconciliation
eﬀorts by Eurocentric progressivisms, which chose as their geographic foci
“national” capitals, or state or regional centers. Having removed themselves at the outset from the constituent communities, from the ethnic
traditional authorities that could legitimate any settlements, and from the
spatial dimension which by itself institutionalizes judicial change in the
everyday interactions of the people, they could not hope to succeed.
And by what “laws” are these judicial disputes to be judged? In Eurocentrism, it is the law of the text, of constitutions, of declarations, of promulgated state statute that reigns. Certainly there is customary law, but that
law is seen as having been transcended in modernity and survives merely
as an ediﬁce for ﬁlling in contingencies where legislation has not yet been
enacted.
In the African traditional society, it is customary law which reigns. This
is due to the fact that customary law is not a pre-modern phase in route to
an alleged evolutionary trajectory toward Greco-Roman models of legalization, but rather the accumulated experiential knowledge of the people in

9)

FU-KIAU 1985.
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historical reﬂection upon the rendering and maintenance of social justice
among one another. Any other “law” would be viewed not only as impersonal, but as foreign, explaining the problematic nature of the “nationstate” as the center of “human rights” advocacy in this sphere. Customary
law draws its resilience and relevance as a result of its role as a repository
for socio-cultural value and systems of aesthetics. Any judicial conclusion
would therefore have to be inculcated into customary law to be deemed
legitimate and truly binding in the minds of the mass of the people. F. U.
Okafor in his book The Igbo Philosophy of Law terms this communal based
system an Ohacracy, the collective will of the people.10
Customary law in the maintenance of Ma’at (spiritual and material balance in the universe as set out by divine law) is used to settle disputes among the people within the community. In the Igbo traditional society it is called Omenala which refers to the practices and
customs which apply to any aspect all aspects of life in the community designed to insure
social harmony and peace.11 Customary law becomes important not because of its rules but,
because of its underlying values.12
The objective in the Gikuyu court system according to Jomo Kenyatta in Facing Mount
Kenya is also to resolve conﬂict using established customary law by way of arbitration. There
are no written rules on how to decide cases. This is unlike the Euro-centric system where it
is done with precedents. Instead, customary judges [elders] rely on the collective wisdom of
the people.13

Then there is the question of “who” will do the deciding. If one is governed
properly by the dictates of customary law, what is preeminent in the selection of judicial authorities is their personal experiential knowledge of that
law. One would have to in that context recognize the overarching authority of the socially-deﬁned elders in the administration of any credible judiciary. There is in this idea the concept of age. Those who have lived in the
material realm longer are presumed to be wiser with respect to the cosmic
laws. They are closest in temporal spatiality to the ancestors who are in the
realm of all knowledge. There is also residence, which may or may not be
the same. This refers to the length of time a person has dwelled in the community. Again, there is the presumption that longevity in this respect is
evidence of one’s longstanding knowledge of, status of being subject to,

10)
11)
12)
13)

Okafor 1992.
Nwala 1985.
Obe 1992, pp. 327–351.
Obe, 1992, pp. 327–351.
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and observation of the administration of customary law. In this respect,
Euro-centrism is most dangerous to its liberalist intent. For too often the
goal is the implementation of “democracy,” inevitably meaning the replacement of traditional, often ethnically-based elder leadership structures with
more populist, external structures. These can be created, but they have
little or no real authority on the local level.
According to the Omenala [custom] it is the job of the elders to preserve peace in the community and maintain social order. The elders, which in most instances are the heads of
families of each household, are given the responsibility of preserving social harmony among
the people by reconciliation, as well as settling familial disputes within the family or between
diﬀerent families.14
The Council of Elders who make up the court system in Akan civilization is called the
Badwafo and their job is to settle disputes between the family members and groups which
include theft, slander, property, and intermarriage conﬂict.
According to Bascom in The Yoruba of Southwestern Nigeria, the elders (the Bale) are
responsible for the resolution of conﬂicts because they have the most extensive knowledge of
the traditional way of life. The Bale also serve as the principal judges in deciding disputes.15
The function of the elder in the Gikuyu then becomes “one of harmonizing the activities
of various groups living and departed. In his capacity of mediator his family group and
community in general respect him for his seniority and wisdom and in turn respects the
seniority of the ancestral spirits”.16

Last but not least, there is the question of what procedures will be applied.
Very commonly the Western conception of “blind justice” is central to
rights advocates. So too, is the adversarial dialectic in which there are the
accused and the accuser. Often the accuser is the state or international
organizations acceded authority by the state to make such judgment. Yet
adversarial justice, in a sense, is precisely opposed to African traditional
understandings of justice. First and foremost, the “accused” is most likely
a member of the community. The goal of all community processes is to
heal the rift. In fact, many African societies prior to colonialism had no
word for “jail.” They did have words for their supreme social penalty,
“exile.” And we should note that this was and is in traditional order, still
analogous to a death penalty. Of course, it could literally mean death in
terms of one being physically expelled from the community and forced to
contend with external forces of nature and humanity without the protection
14)
15)
16)

Nwala 1985; Paris 1995.
Bascom, 1984.
Kenyatta 1953, p. 265.
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of the society. But more philosophically speaking, exile was a permanent
penalty which disconnected the individual from the collective. The African
conception of the individual was that individuality was collectively deﬁned
and thus to be disconnected was to die in spiritual and social terms.
The Eurocentric science ﬁction series Star Trek: The Next Generation
played at non-Western conceptions of individuality and its clash with
external cultural forms. Two particular examples come to mind here. The
ﬁrst involves the creatures known as the Borg. Whereas in Western terms
disconnection and exile from the core was styled as “freedom,” for the Borg
it was to be cast into a world of misery and to move from universal clarity
and essential cosmic connection to the whole to the solitary and silent
isolation of personhood. The second example was a Klingon ritual in which
one took blame for his families sins. The culmination of the ritual was the
turning away from that familial representative and the nulliﬁcation of their
social identity.
Assuming the oﬀense is not one warranting the supreme punishment,
of which there are few, then the goal of any judicial proceeding is the
reintegration of the individual in the community and the provision of
reparation for those wronged. This mitigates against an adversarial methodology because such a methodology conﬁrms the disequilibrium that is
the enemy of the restorative justice process. Justice cannot be blind either,
for if justice is blind, She cannot conﬁrm that there has in fact, been a
restoration of equilibrium. Using the stolen Eurocentric symbol of Liberty
with scales (actually a bastardized form of the ancient African goddess
Ma’at) as a metaphor, we might note that all sorts of mischief are likely to
occur with the scales and their contents and weighing in the absence of her
capacity for sight.
In the Ashanti civilization, private oﬀenses are called eﬁsems. Eﬁsems aﬀect the social relations of persons or groups living in the community, while public oﬀenses (Oman Akyiwade)
aﬀect the relationship between the community on the one hand, and the chief and the
ancestors on the other.17
Among the Akan, the aim in settling household disputes is to reconcile the parties through
arbitration.18 This is done through a rite of reconciliation in the Mpata, a reconciliation fee
in the form of a drink, accompanied by an apology, is given to the oﬀended. Both parties
then swear by the elders present that they will hereafter live at peace with each other”.19
17)
18)
19)

Ayittey 1991.
Manoukian 1950, p. 40.
Ayittey 1991, p. 45.

https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/swb/vol3/iss2/4
DOI: 101163/187219108X300055

12

Imani: Critical Impairments to Globalizing the Western Human Rights Disc

282

N. O. Imani / Societies Without Borders 3 (2008) 270–284
Among the Yoruba of Southwestern Nigeria, the goal is to resolve the matters through
peaceful settlement. The Bale (elders) are consistent with the maintenance of Ma’at because
they settle disputes by deliberation and discussion, rather than by force, correcting the wrong
doing by compensation except for oﬀenses such as murder and they adjudicate and assess the
matter impartially (1969)
In the Gikuyu court system, the elder looks at the conﬂict and decides what would be best
for the individuals who are feuding and the collective society writ large. It is recognized that
when there is conﬂict there is disunity, and when there is disunity there is disorder, which is
a violation of Ma’at (harmony, order, and balance). The elder’s job in reconciliation and
the restoration of Ma’at (social order) is to “bring the disputing parties into a mutual agreement, and to avoid any act of vengeance which might result in the breaking up of the
family group”.20
In Schapera’s book The Tswana it is noted that people can appeal to the Chief Court if
they are dissatisﬁed with the decisions of informal courts. In the Chief Court people involved
in the dispute or those accused of an oﬀense always appear and speak for themselves (they
plead in person). The judge (elder), in reaching his decision about the customary law, relies
on personal knowledge of the law and upon the guidance of others present in court. All cases
are heard in public and anyone present is free to attend and take part in the proceedings.
This includes questioning parties involved, the witnesses, reviewing of the evidence, etc.
After all the evidence is heard the judge renders a decision.21
The Igbo have a similar system. When a man from a neighboring village is accused of
stealing property, he is brought in by his accuser. The Priest reports the matter to the Elders
of the village, and also to the Elders of the accused. There is a “trial” at the marketplace the
next day. The Elders pile their Ofo (a staﬀ that symbolizes the link between the Ancestors in
the spiritual realm and the Elders seeking to exact Ma’at in the form of justice in the material realm) on the ground and the Priest of Ala asks the ancestors for guidance in ﬁnding
the truth. He asks the Ancestors to “help us try the case impartially, and assist us when we
endeavor to ﬁnd examples of the procedure in former times. If the accused has stolen the
[item] you constrain him to confess.” A libation is then poured for the Ancestors to join in
the gathering. After the pouring of the libation each Priest from the village says “Life of men
and women-protect us all.”
Then the accuser and the accused tell their story of the events that took place. Witnesses
are called to tell what they know about the event and they are told that they “must not do
it in the spirit of envy or hatred for you may be called upon to swear.” The Elders as well as
the public can ask questions and a decision is made by the Elders. If the accused has sworn
an oath to Ala than a decision is reached by a Priest outside the village. Delegates who are
not related to the accused or the accuser are summoned and after they have been picked they
are sworn to say to Ala “If these men go to Igwe and conceal or falsify what Igwe tells them
may you Ala, Ancestors, and Ofo take away their lives.” They solidify the oath by sharing
Kola nut to symbolize unity and a commitment to the ancestors and the Creator in seeking
justice [Ma’at].22

20)
21)
22)

Kenyatta 1953, p. 214.
Schapera, 1953, pp. 53–57.
Meek, 1937, p. 151
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African traditional society takes the position that the events that are in
dispute are best told by those who participated. There are no advocates
because it is the disputants who can best tell their stories as only they know
how. There are no bars on what can be “admitted into evidence” as in the
Euro-centric system because all information is relevant to coming to a fair
and just determination. Everyone can ask questions about the events because
they all have a stake in the outcome and want to know the truth.
The Elders who decide the case based on customary law are trusted
because they are respected in the community for their wisdom. The elders
understand that if they fail in their duties than they are subjected to spiritual as well as material sanctions. The Oath to tell the truth before the
Ancestors facilitates a just and fair outcome because failing to do so may
have unwanted consequences from the spiritual realm that can aﬀect an
individual family or the entire community.

The Irreconcilability of These Alternative Conceptions of
Democratization and the Implications for a Westernized
“Human Rights” Pursuit
Those that would politically “liberate” African people or bring them political “freedom” through various mechanisms of judicial responsibility should
be wary of assuming that the Eurocentric forms of those will provide any
acceptable vehicle. Not only will they fail, but worse, they run the risk
of exacerbating conditions of colonialism and neocolonialism in the areas
where they are applied. This takes us back to the original problem of the
Echo-Narcissus dialectic, “hearing their voices.” Question one, Echo says
to us that which Euro-centrists are likely to hear is that which they desire
to hear. It is sound of their own aspirations for liberation from their own
self-constructed systems of oppression reﬂected back in the words of those
they have victimized. Question two, having heard, however errantly, are
they victimized then by Narcissus and the belief that not only is the voice
of the aspiration an echo, but the satisfaction of the aspiration inevitably
to be found in the mechanisms of oppression wielded by the colonizers
themselves?
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